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MANUFACTURERS' RESPONSES TO FUEL SUPPLY PROBLEMS
Evelyn R. Rosenthal
State University of New York
Binghamton, New York

Abstract
The progress of energy conservation in industry was investigated
with the aim of identifying barriers to strong energy conservation
efforts. One of these barriers proved to be fuel supply problems
as exemplified by the natural gas shortage of 1976-77.
1.

field of organizational behavior, Berg's
proved to be only partly true.

INTRODUCTION

Widespread awareness of our national prof
ligate use of non-renewable fuels dates
from the events of Winter 1973-74.
I will
not recount those events here except to
note that fuel use awareness rose in step
with fuel prices. (1) Management in manu
facturing plants prudently instituted en
ergy conservation programs, often with un
expected returns of fuel savings as high
as 307» from small investments in labor and
equipment. From the point of view of en
ergy conservation in industry, the oil
crisis accomplished in a short time much
more than had the ideas and exhortations
of scientists, technicians and conserva
tionists. However, industry's accomplish
ments in energy conservation still lag
behind what many analysts in and out of
industry believe to be technologically
possible and economically feasible. (2)
Writing in Science on 19 April 1974, Char
les A. Berg-] then chief engineer at the
Federal Power Commission, speculated on
the reasons for this. (3) He surmised
that barriers to the adoption of more
energy-efficient equipment and procedures
by industry were not, in 1974, technologi
cal nor economic but institutional and
political. In Berg's view, increased
awareness on the part of industrial mana
gers of the economic potential of fuel
conservation would lead to rapid disman
tling of institutional barriers and sub
stantial reductions in the energy needs of
industry. As with most predictions in the
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Beginning in the Spring of 1977 a team of
researchers from the State University of
New York at Binghamton examined a sample
of industry's energy conservation activi
ties.
(The research team includes E.
Rosenthal, assistant professor of sociolo
gy, S. Hsu, associate professor of geog
raphy, E. Hughs and S. Sutherlan, graduate
students in geography.
The research is
supported under a contract from the Feder
al Energy Research and Development Admin
istration to the State University of New
York Research Foundation.) We sought to
identify the institutional and political
barriers to more efficient industry use of
fuel. One of those barriers proved to be
uncertainty of fuel supplies, as experi
enced by industrial users of natural gas
during the Winter of 1976-77.
I will
describe briefly the course of energy con
servation efforts up to 1976 as a back
ground for demonstrating the effects of
the gas shortage on conservation efforts.
Some of the organizational conditions con
ducive to rapid adoption of energy conser
vation measures by 1976 will be suggested.
More specifically, I will focus on the
role of the natural gas crisis as a bar
rier to energy conservation by presenting
examples of management's coping strategies
when faced with gas supply curtailments.
Last, I will explore the implications of
those strategies for the future of energy
conservation in industry.

2.

DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This past Spring and Summer we interviewed
executives and managers in 31 manufactur
ing plants in two Northeastern metropoli
tan areas. We chose our 31 case studies
on the basis of diversity of plant size,
product, fuel needs, age, level of auto
mation and current rate of expansion in
order to test Berg's model of rational
corporate decision-making in a wide vari
ety of technological and organizational
contexts.* Our interviews were mainly
open-ended discussions of how management
was dealing with energy problems of rising
fuel prices and natural gas shortages, but
also included several structured questions
on plant fuel use patterns, the organiza
tion of the firm, proposed federal energy
policy options, and details of manage
ment's information search behavior with
respect to energy saving technology. In
most plants, we were given access to rec
ords of fuel usage back to 1970. We were
generously provided with data documenting
management decisions on past energy con
servation actions and future plans. Where
security clearance was not a problem, we
were permitted to tape our interviews and
walk through the plant.
The data gathered from these non-randomly
chosen case studies can only be sugges
tive of management behavior in general;
validation of the findings will rest on
results from a broader study not yet com
pleted. Designed primarily as a pilot
project prefacing a national inquiry into
the extent, nature and pace of industrial
plants' energy conservation efforts, these
case studies nevertheless afford an oppor
tunity to examine in detail managements
responses to recent natural gas supply
problems.
3.

THE PROGRESS OF ENERGY CONSERVATION
PRACTICES IN INDUSTRY TO 1976

expand their use in the plant of energyefficient technologies and procedures.
Energy-efficiency gains were most impres
sive in plant heating, cooling and ven
tilation; managers showed much more reluc
tance to risk innovations in production
processes.** In every plant we visited,
management had done something about energy
conservation; even the laggards in adop
ting energy conservation technologies had
typically lowered thermostats in office
areas and attended to some previously
neglected maintenance chores, while the
pioneers had completed energy audits,
made capital investments in more energyefficient equipment, developed plans to
meet plant-wide energy use goals, and in
a few cases were experimenting with new
production techniques. Plants weak in
energy conservation actions had not yet
begun to monitor energy use in any sys
tematic manner nor had they conducted an
energy audit; nine of the 31 plants were
in this category. On the other hand, nine
plants had responded strongly to energy
conservation. The remaining 13 plants
fell between these extremes. We based
these judgments on the length of time
since management had begun acting on con
servation awareness as well as the extent
of their implementation of conservation
measures by 1976.
I need to emphasize here the subjective
nature of these ratings in spite of our
efforts to systematize them. Each plant
was assigned a conservation score theo
retically ranging from zero to 12 on the
basis of our analysis of interview tran
scripts and notes from plant walk
throughs. The scores reflect organiza
tional changes, technological innovations
and the timing of these responses. The
lowest score assigned was two; the
highest 12.
Plants typically adopted few technological
innovations without prior organizational
changes.
I will not list the diverse
energy-efficient technological innovations
here; our research team is preparing a
full analysis of these changes. Organiza-

Most managers, confident of continuing
general fuel price rises, and aware of the
economic potential of conservation, did
attack institutional barriers and adopt or

*Rogers and Shoemaker (4) discuss the model of social change impli
cit in Berg's statements, and alternative models as well. Their
work includes a comprehensive bibliography of empirical diffusion
research from several theoretical traditions.
**The historical tendency of U.S. industrial leadership, with few
exceptions, to avoid risk-taking through innovations in the produc
tion process is documented by Strassman (5) for the 19th century.
My own research, nearing completion, documents for the 20th century
a conservative approach to production innovations on the part of
U.S. industry that reflects exaggerated and often non-rationally
based perceptions of risk.
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tional changes that indicate a high pri
ority for energy conservation include:
close monitoring of fuel use in production
and in work environment, assignment of
responsibility for energy management to a
high ranking executive, formation of an
energy task force, information search be
havior such as attendance at industry
association or fuel supplier seminars, en
gagement of outside consultants, and modi
fication of financial policy to permit ex
tended payback periods for investments in
energy efficiency. Although we observed
no common time sequence among these ac
tions, plants typically began with un
systematic attempts at improving plant
maintenance and reducing fuel use for
space heating and cooling. Those who
would prove to be most successful in con
servation soon assigned responsibility for
energy management to an individual or per
manent committee reporting directly to the
plant's chief executive. When the chief
executive assumed responsibility for en
ergy management without benefit of a com
mittee or energy officer, however, the
results were at the extremes:
either
nothing more was accomplished or the
plant's efforts were outstanding.
As summarized in Table 1, large plant
size, rapid growth of production, rela
tively new plant equipment, a technicallytrained plant manager and plant autonomy
in decision-making were important factors
related to rapid adoption of many energy
conservation measures. We were surprised
to find that neither energy-intensiveness
of plant production nor management's per
ceptions of the causes or future direc
tion of energy problems were related to
energy conservation efforts. As expected,
we found that gas shortages were suffered
equally by those who had adopted conser
vation-oriented policies as well as those
who had not.
Interviews at plants where efforts lagged
supported the converse of Berg's conten
tion that conservation actions follow
economic incentives. In other words, weak
conservation programs were associated with
low management awareness of the economic
potential of fuel efficiency measures.
Typically, the managers and executives at
these plants ranked fuel last, if at all,
when recounting the factors that influence
their decisions. But high awareness of
the economic potential of energy conser
vation did not guarantee strong efforts to
achieve energy savings.
In four cases
where management had been surprised by un
expectedly large cost savings from im
proved plant maintenance practices, con
servation efforts went no further. Here,
management rejected technological and or
ganizational changes that would lead to
conservation and instead pleaded preoccu
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pation with more urgent problems such as
labor turnover, marketing difficulties or
meeting production goals. Very old plant
equipment or, at the other extreme,
specially designed, highly automated plant
equipment were mentioned by management as
barriers to more effective energy conser
vation programs. In our sample, old or
highly automated equipment was related to
weak conservation programs, especially in
plants with little local autonomy from
centralized decision-making.
Table 1
Plant Characteristics and Energy
Conservation Success (N=31)
Strength of
Association
With
Conservation
Success

Plant Characteristics

strong

plant decisions autonomous
of centralized authority
(n-13)

strong

recent rapid growth of pro
duction (n=10)

strong

plant manager has technical/scientific training
(n-16)

strong

bulk of plant equipment at
moderate level of automa
tion (n=ll)

moderate

bulk of plant equipment 10
years old or less (n=ll)

moderate

300 employees or more (n=12)

no rela
tionship

management views energy
problems as worsening in
the future (n=21)

no rela
tionship

management ascribes energy
problems to political
causes (n=14)

no rela
tionship

high energy cost per dollar
output (n=15)

no rela
tionship

plant experienced gas cut
back of 30% or more (n=18)

4. THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
CURTAILMENTS OF 1976-77 ON THE PROGRESS
OF ENERGY CONSERVATION PRACTICES IN
INDUSTRY
Our case study results show a heterogene
ity of responses to natural gas supply cur
tailments in contrast to the similarity of
management's general fuel price rise
coping strategies described above.

Clearly, supply curtailments tested the
ingenuity of management in a manner that
the all-too-familiar problems of rising
costs did not. The two challenges of
management, that of rising rosts and of
unavailability of natural gas at any cost,
were perceived to be fundamentally dif
ferent and to require responses that re
flected this difference. Management saw
the first challenge, rising fuel costs,
as a hardship but not a crisis; most met
the challenge by monitoring fuel use with
an eye toward holding down costs and plan
ning for the future on the assumption of
continuing fuel price increases. To
management, the second challenge of un
availability of natural gas at any cost
was a major crisis if the plant depended
on natural gas. Plant shutdowns were
common; future plans regarding energy use
showed a reordering of priorities away
from holding down costs toward gaining
independence from natural gas. Overall,
our investigation suggests that industry's
recent experience with managing gas sup
ply curtailments worked against the goals
of energy conservation.
Some examples
from our case studies will document this
conclusion.
Of the 31 plants we studied, 18 had ex
perienced moderate to severe natural gas
supply problems, with all but two of
these supply curtailments first coming
during the Winter of 1976-77 (we define a
curtailment of 307„ or more of base year
usage as moderate to severe). One plant
had been cut back on gas the year before
and another had had gas supply problems
since 1975. Although management response
to natural gas supply curtailments varied
widely, concern for dollar or energy
savings was unambiguously subordinated to
the goal of maintaining control over pro
duction at all costs. Frequently,
management's actions reflected the inter
action of the timing of the gas curtail
ment with the economic and technological
state of the plant. If a plant depended
on natural gas for production or had no
alternative fuel capacity for plant
heating, immediate action was forced by
the curtailment of gas supplies. The
economic situation of the firm dictated
whether the immediate action was to pur
chase a costly substitute fuel or curtail
production to keep within fuel allotments.
Of the 18 plants cut back on gas, we saw
only two cases where gas curtailment
directly stimulated energy conservation.
Both plants were already strongly commit
ted to conservation goals and had acted
early on that commitment. In one of
these, a large chemical plant, management
capitalized on the extensive publicity
surrounding the natural gas shortages by

enlisting the cooperation of workers in
an all-out plant conservation effort. Al
though the company was a leader in conser
vation, past attempts at this particular
plant to engage workers directly in those
efforts had met with apathy.
In this
case, conservation benefits persisted af
ter the gas crisis subsided. This counter
example to our general conclusion is in
cluded here not only for the sake of fair
ness, but also to demonstrate that very
special circumstances need to be present
in order for the gas shortage to work for
energy conservation. The unique recent
history of each plant was often the de
termining factor in management's response.
The energy manager of the plant, a
chemical engineer, described to us the
problem and his solution:
When the gas curtailment came we
anticipated it, we had been con
serving before the actual cur
tailment came. In February the
curtailment came, effective Feb
ruary 8, we were trying as much
as we could to hold down the gas
usage. Curtailment came in the
form of a phone call saying we
would be cut to plant protection
levels. Now these plant protec
tion levels were figured on 1972
volumes, volumes of the plant
and the efficiency of the insul
ation, to maintain plant tem
peratures at 45 degrees so the
pipes don't freeze and that
other areas in the plant would
be protected. When the PSC came
out they found that we were ac
tually using less than what they
had cut us to at plant protection
levels. They cut us to 75
thousand cubic feet per day; we
ended up running in the red line
on the chart, nearer to 50
thousand per day.
So, we ended
up using less than we were sup
posed to be using for plant pro
tection and keeping up our pro
duction right along with it. It's
hard to push energy conservation
on people working in a plant -we're not union here, we have no
union problem -- but people get
too uncomfortable, they start
grumbling, girls in the office
like the air conditioning on cold,
the heat on hot -- and this kind
of thing comes along.
It just
gives you that extra oomph you
need to push conservation on the
people. This is why we had the
graph, so everybody knew where
we stood. People got in the
swing of this conservation thing
and wanted to help. After the

initial impact it went over
pretty good because they were
happy to have their jobs. Other
plants were being shut down.

of course, is first. Now even
with cost, during this last
Winter -- propane is not as
available as it has been, pro
pane in some cases is classed
as a byproduct of the natural
gas industry -- we have had a
great deal of problems main
taining enough propane from
time to time to operate. We
have since expanded our [pro
pane] storage facilities as of
this Spring. We have expanded
our fuel oil storage facilities
in preparation for this Winter.
But we really have done, I be
lieve, everything possible to
reduce energy usage.

This happy outcome was made possible by
three fortuitous conditions:
1972 energyuse patterns served as the base year for
calculating gas allocations, the plant's
production had not grown since 1972, and
energy conservation efforts since 1972
had been successful in reducing plant fuel
needs by better than 30% and natural gas
needs by closer to 507o. In two additional
plants the gas shortage may later prove
to have contributed indirectly to conser
vation: these two plants had done little
to conserve energy in the past and
managed the gas supply crisis by shutting
down. However, the necessity of close
monitoring of gas use to avoid penalties
with minimum shutdown time led in both
cases to the appointment of a full-time
energy manager. As pointed out above,
this organizational change often prefaced
strong conservation efforts, and may well
prove to stimulate energy conservation in
the future in these two plants.

The plant did not shut down, and produc
tion was maintained by using propane gas
where necessary at double the cost of
natural gas. In addition, a new electri
cal heating system was installed in the
Spring for office space. The total
natural gas allotment has thus been freed
for production use in the future, but at
a cost that management considers unretrievable:

Since only two of the 18 plants that ex
perienced gas supply cuts took actions
conducive to energy conservation, the
example cited above is most atypical in
our group. More typical among our obser
vations, and in sharp contrast to the case
just cited, was the response in a second
chemical plant. This plant's record in
energy conservation was also excellent up
to 1976 but cuts in gas supply reordered
management priorities and discouraged con
tinued conservation efforts. Again, top
management led a strong energy conserva
tion effort early on, but the plant had
more than doubled its production capacity
in the past four years. When natural gas
curtailment came, the plant's allotment
was based on use patterns generated prior
to expansion but after energy conservation
efforts had begun. The executive vicepresident of the firm, the chief execu
tive at this particular plant and also a
chemical engineer, described his dilemma:
Within the past four years we
have literally doubled our pro
duction facilities insofar as
equipment, but there's no addi
tional gas allowable for expan
sion. So, we had to put in an
alternate type of equipment not
as an alternate source [of fuel]
but as a primary source -- which
now is classed as alternate.
Which in turn takes away some of
the natural gas that we normally
would be getting. This has posed
many problems for us; the cost,

We really can't consider pay
back periods when it's a shor
tage of fuel we can't get other
wise. I think this is secondary
to payback. I like to say, yes,
we have a two year or three year
payback. We used to figure
seven years was good. Today,
most of our equipment we like to
look at one [year] , but on this
[the new heating system] we
cannot consider a total payback
period.
It's insurance money,
to be sure we can maintain pro
duction. This is what we're
doing now.
In this case, management's attention was
preoccupied with the goal of protecting
production in a rapidly expanding plant.
The management strategies of increasing
fuel storage capacity and abandoning sole
reliance on natural gas where possible by
installing alternate fuel standby equip
ment or totally replacing existing gas
using equipment are expensive measures
but necessary to protect production.
These strategies are either irrelevant or
run counter to goals of energy conserva
tion. They do not cut overall fuel usage,
and more importantly, divert the firm's
resources from further investment in con
servation to investment in protection.
An alternative response to natural gas
shortages, encountered in four plants,
was political: management appealed the
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equity of natural gas allotments. All
four cases were successful in having gas
supplies restored. In one case, manage
ment met with quick success since the
original allocation was based on classi
fication as a dual-fuel capacity plant
when in fact the standby coal-fired boiler
had not been operative in 15 years. When
we visited the plant, a new coal-fired
boiler was in the process of being in
stalled. During the crisis period of
about two weeks, this rapidly growing
manufacturer of computerized machinery
had maintained a fairly comfortable work
environment by renting several large
electrical space heaters; the production
process does not depend on natural gas.
A latecomer to conservation efforts and a
large user of electricity, the company
appointed early in 1976 an energy manager
trained in finance who monitors energy
costs and plans to conduct a plant energy
audit.
This plant's strategy typifies a middleground case where management had lagged in
energy conservation activity but began to
respond to high electricity costs by 1976,
before the natural gas crisis. The new
energy manager's time was temporarily
diverted from starting his projected
energy audit in order to meet the prob
lems caused by total natural gas curtail
ment. The gas curtailment was not viewed
by management as a devastating event, how
ever, since it did not interfere with
production.
In this plant and two of the others where
a political solution was tried and suc
ceeded, natural gas usage was fairly light
and not necessary for production. The
fourth, a large primary metals plant, is
a heavy natural gas user in its produc
tion process. Management responded to
gas supply problems beginning in 1975
with political action but undertook other
measures as well. Ironically, this case's
parent company is widely cited in govern
ment documents as being heavily involved
in solving the country's energy problems.
Although we judged energy conservation
actions at this plant to be minimal, the
president of the firm described to us
his multiple strategies for coping with
gas supply problems in this older plant
with a steady state of production.
Again, protection not conservation is the
dominant theme:
We are operating on a 20 year
firm gas contract, which means
that in 1959 we signed a con
tract that gave us ten thousand
mcf a day, firm, of natural gas.
Which turned out starting in
1975 not to be so firm. Be
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cause of the nature of our
operations, we are damaged ex
tensively if we lose natural
gas because our refractories
and our furnaces are damaged.
It’s a very critical situation
with us. So, in 1975 when the
first shortage developed we
were ordered to shut down our
furnaces.
In essence [this]
would have meant that we would
have lost our furnaces. And, we
went to hearings in Washington,
etc., the whole bit, and for
tunately were able to keep our
head above water. Now the next
couple of years the same sort of
thing developed, but the mechanisms
for dealing with it had been
propagated by the FPC and you now
can buy gas on an emergency basis
but at a very high cost. So, we
have been able to get through the
last two Winters basically by
spending more money. We have,
since the natural gas shortage
developed, changed perhaps 207o
of our natural gas usage to oil.
For major uses, however, oil is
not a substitute...
Another thing that we did: we
put the propane system in. We
went to Louisiana and you know,
it's a jungle down there, and it
took us about a year and a half
before we were able to buy this
gas. But, that is a part of our
program to try and protect our
selves. We have purchased gas
and propane for emergencies.
Propane is really too expensive
to use, but in our situation it
is an emergency thing in case the
gas company calls us up and says,
starting now you got no gas!
At this plant, coping with natural gas
shortages proved to be very expensive.
However, energy conservation at the plant
had received very minor attention up to
1976 and no clear future conservation
plans existed at the time of our visit.
These few examples illustrate managerial
actions stimulated by a common experience
under a variety of conditions. There were
further variations of responses: five
plants shut down to keep within natural
gas allocations. Some plants managed the
gas shortage easily because of existing
dual-fuel capacity and no reliance on gas
for production.
In one plant, the gas
cutback was met by moving all non-produc
tion activities from the plant site to
rented commercial facilities. Where
possible, management's top priorities for

actions in the energy area in the near
future were for shedding reliance on
natural gas in favor of fuels more depen
dable in supply, even at high dollar cost.
Although only two of our cases responded
to natural gas cutback with energy con
servation efforts, we cannot rule out the
possibility that additional cases will
become more active in conservation as a
result of their experiences this past
Winter. Based on our observations, how
ever, we see gas supply problems as a
barrier to promoting energy conservation
in industry. Management priorities were
diverted from conservation goals to goals
oriented toward protection of plant
operations. Immediate decisions as well
as future plans were mostly irrelevant or
inimical to the goals of reducing the
overall fuel needs of industry. Reduc
tion of uncertainty and maintenance of
control in production took precedence
over energy conservation and economy most
noticeably in plants experiencing rapid
growth of production along with gas
shortages.
The implications of further gas shortages,
or shortages of other fuels in the future,
are not optimistic from the point of view
of energy conservation. Management
responded to the gas shortage as if they
had been caught in a sudden rainstorm: a
few had umbrellas, most ran for protec
tion, some railed at the heavens. Only
two took the opportunity to further on
going conservation programs.
4.
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